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ABSTRACT  
The seemingly infinite possibilities of contemporary neuroscience span from the 
augmentation of memory, executive function, appetite, libido, sleep, and mood, to the 
maturation and development of emotional health and personality. These prospects hint at 
the capacity to alter neurocognitive conceptions of reality. They also mark the 
unavoidable inculcation of nuanced individual responses, perhaps radical, to these “tailor-
made” perceptions. Hence, there exists certain neuroethical, and even more generally, 
existential risks within this fascinating and expeditious enterprise. The primary question 
in the context of present-day neurotechnology is not what can be done, but what should 
be. To that end, this paper examines the concepts of memory, executive function, and 
emotional health and personality in the context of neurocognitive enhancement and posits 
the argument that neurocognitive enhancement can be justified as morally plausible in its 
potential to edify the caliber of overall cognition, and thus contribute to the ability to 
make pragmatically, robust moral decisions on the conditions that it (1) promotes general 
moral character, (2) compliments human nature, and (3) effects a deeper sense of 
individual and social identity.  
 




















THE BIONIC BRAIN: PRAGMATIC NEUROETHICS AND THE MORAL 
PLAUSIBILITY OF COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT 





 The seemingly infinite possibilities of contemporary neuroscience span from the 
augmentation of memory, executive function, appetite, libido, sleep, and mood1 to the 
maturation and development of emotional health and personality.2 These prospects hint at 
the capacity to alter neurocognitive conceptions of reality. They also mark the 
unavoidable inculcation of nuanced individual responses, perhaps radical, to these “tailor-
made” perceptions. Hence, there exists certain neuroethical,3 and even more generally 
existential, risks within this fascinating and expeditious enterprise. The primary question 
in the context of present-day neurotechnology is not what can be done, but what should 
be.  
 
 To date, the debate over enhancement has been riddled with fallacious and 
ambiguous rhetoric, and the effect has spawned a bitter stalemate between the primary 
interlocutors. One cause of the current impasse is the mistaken idea that to enhance 
something – or, in the neuroscientific context, to allow greater access into dormant but 
existent biological faculties – de facto denotes the pursuit of its mastery or perfection. 
This is the concern, for example, of the 20034 President’s Council on Bioethics5 explored 
in their document “Beyond Therapy.”6 For this group, neurocognitive enhancement7 
paves the already-too-tempting road to a brave new world in which humans are gods of 
their own. A converse view, to which this paper subscribes, contends that the concepts of 
enhancement and perfection are mutually exclusive, and that enhancement has little to do, 
 
 1. Martha J. Farah, Judy Illes, Robert Cook-Deegan, Howard Gardner, Eric Kandel, Patricia King, 
Eric Parens, Barbara Sahakian, and Paul Root Wolpe, “Neurocognitive Enhancement: What Can We Do 
and What Should We Do?” in Neuroethics: An Introduction with Readings, ed. Martha J. Farah 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2010), 30-41. 
 2. Turhan Canli and Zenab Amin, “Neuroimaging of Emotion and Personality: Ethical 
Considerations,” in Neuroethics: An Introduction with Readings, ed. Martha J. Farah (Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press, 2010), 147-54. 
 3. For a clear and concise introduction to the expansive language, attributes, and perspectives of 
neuroethics, both past and present, see Eric Racine, Pragmatic Neuroethics: Improving Treatment and 
Understanding of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2010), 27-51.  
 4. This group of scholars worked under and was formed by the political regime of George W. 
Bush.  
 5. Henceforth, “the Council.”  
 6. President’s Council on Bioethics, “Beyond Therapy: Essential Sources of Concern,” in 
Neuroethics: An Introduction with Readings, ed. Martha J. Farah (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2010), 
58-72. See especially pp. 69-75. 
 7. It is important to clarify that the logic inherent to the Council’s general positions vis-à-vis 
biotechnological enhancement is herein applied specifically in the neurocognitive context. Hence, this 
paper does not intend to misconstrue the original content of “Beyond Therapy” as representative of the 
Council’s explicit address of neurocognitive enhancement, but only biotechnological enhancement 
generally, which in turn may (presumably) be applied in specific contexts.  
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in fact, with the desire to become perfected. The juxtaposition of these two polarized 
positions will comprise the framework of the arguments explored in this paper. 
 
 To be sure, the issues of immediate import to the debate surrounding 
neurocognitive enhancement are manifold, and any singular analysis of topics, no matter 
how sweeping, will unavoidably fall short of adequacy. This paper recognizes such 
limitations, and thus aims to briefly address but three: memory (recollection), executive 
function,8 and emotional health and personality.9 The aim and proposal of the paper is to 
examine the concepts of memory, executive function,10 and emotional health and 
personality in the context of neurocognitive enhancement with the intention of positing 
the argument that neurocognitive enhancement can justified as morally plausible in its 
potential to edify the caliber of overall cognition and thus contribute to the ability make 
pragmatically robust moral decisions on the conditions that it (i) promotes general moral 
character, (ii) compliments human nature, and (iii) effects a deeper sense of individual11 
and social12 identity.  
 
 MORAL CHARACTER AND THE MEMORABLE-RECOLLECTIVE BRAIN 
 
 A first point of divergence in the enhancement debate concerns moral character. 
Refocused in the context of neurocognition, it specifically concerns how moral character 
is affected by manipulating the natural human capacity to recollect. Generally speaking, 
human identity is reducible in part to the decisions one makes, the actions one pursues, 
and the responsibility taken for the sum of the parts. Hence, whom one is flows forth 
from what one decides to do and acts on doing, and moral character is shaped by this 
means. Utilizing neurotechnological enhancement is one such decision and action that 
significantly affects and shapes moral character. Since more than just biophysiology is as 
stake in the choice to pursue neurocognitive enhancement, recognition of the promises 
and perils of its effects on identity, mentality, free will, and, particularly in considerations 
of the mind-brain relationship, memory, are things for which moral character, shaped by 
moral responsibility, must account.   
 
Hubris and Humility 
 
 
 8. For coverage of both memory (recollection) and executive function, see Farah et al., 
“Neurocognitive Enhancement,” 30-41. See especially pp. 31-34.  
 9. See Canli and Amin, “Neuroimaging of Emotion and Personality,” 147-54.  
 10. By this phrase is meant the neurocognitive abilities that allow for flexible, task-oriented 
responses in the face of manifold and often competing neurological inputs or more habitual but 
inappropriate behavioral response patterns. See Farah et al., “Neurocognitive Enhancement,” 30-41. See 
especially pp. 33-34. 
 11. These three conditions, among others, form the contra argument vis-à-vis enhancement of the 
2003 President’s Council on Bioethics. See President’s Council on Bioethics, “Beyond Therapy,” 58-72. 
See especially pp. 58-65.  
 12. For an expansive examination of the social implications of neuroscience accompanied by an 
epistemological framework for the neuroscience of ethics, see Racine, Pragmatic Neuroethics, 179-213.  
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 With regard to moral character, the Council’s rhetoric13 against enhancement is 
couched in expressivist and consequentialist concerns. The former regards the idea that 
the pursuit of enhancement itself denotes moral viciousness and, hence, poor moral 
character. The latter regards the moral forecast that enhancement would inevitably lead to 
the weakening of moral character. The strongest expressivist concern lies in the Council’s 
contention that pursuing enhancement fails to exemplify respect for “the given” in nature 
and instead exhibits the hubris of those who act with “hyper-agent” wisdom they fail to 
possess.14 Since appreciation is the product of humility – a precondition for the 
possession of other moral virtues – enhancement inevitably proves a stumbling block for 
the development of virtues necessary to live a substantive moral life. In this sense, the 
Council’s stance is equal parts essentialist and consequentialist.15 
 
 Applied in the context of neurocognitive enhancement, the Council’s threefold 
premises include the notions that (i) appreciation for what one has been given is a human 
good of central importance that develops virtuous moral character; (ii) the pursuit of 
nontherapeutic memory enhancement as a form of mastery and perfection is ultimately at 
odds with this sense of appreciation; and (iii) the employment of memory enhancement 
and its products are an instance of the pursuit of mastery or perfection. From these 
premises can be derived two fundamental conclusions. The first is that the employment of 
memory enhancement is ultimately incongruous with appreciation for “the given” in 
nature. The second is that the employment of memory enhancement is ultimately 
incongruous with a central human good of which virtuous moral character requisitely 
consists.16   
 
The Morality of Memory Encoding 
 
 This paper finds such essentialist and consequentialist logic misguided. 
Essentialist and consequentialist concerns are typically the culprit of two primary errors. 
First, they assume that all persons who pursue enhancement possess an insatiable craving 
for mastery or perfection.17 Second, essentialist and consequentialist concerns take the 
notion of gratitude at face value rather than considering it a vague concept expressive of 
something more appropriate and less bogged down by theological rhetoric.18 To be sure, 
 
 13. Included in the introductory remarks of “Beyond Therapy” is the Council’s recognition that “it 
will be hard to say what is wrong with any biotechnological intervention that could improve our 
performances. . . . Indeed, in many cases, we ought to be thankful for or pleased with the improvements our 
technological ingenuity is making possible.” They spend the remainder of the document, however, 
endeavoring to explicate precisely why they are not. See President’s Council on Bioethics, “Beyond 
Therapy,” 58-72. See especially p. 58.  
 14. The President’s Council on Bioethics, “Beyond Therapy,” 59-61.  
 15. This logic is echoed most notably by the political philosopher Michael Sandel. For a thorough 
analysis of the expressivist and consequentialist concerns of the “anti-enhancement” camp, see Sandel’s 
The Case Against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2007).  
 16. See the President’s Council on Bioethics, “Beyond Therapy,” 59-61.  
 17. The necessitation of spectacles for night driving, for example, proves foolish this point. Surely 
the driver desires neither mastery nor perfection in the endeavor to ensure the safety of self and others.  
 18. Both the vagueness and the presupposition of the theological nature underlying the concept of 
gratitude are swiftly identified upon posing the question, “to what/whom?”  
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every person should be concerned with the risks of becoming exceedingly focused on the 
beneficial effects of enhancement to the extent that they cease to be appreciative of the 
things they have. But such risks are not ipso facto unavoidable, and a person who focuses 
on what is to be gleaned from neurocognitive enhancement at the cost of appreciating 
current possessions already exhibits a deficiency in moral character.  
 
 Moreover, essentialist and consequentialist concerns fail to acknowledge the 
possibility that memory enhancement may preserve, if not explicitly develop, one’s sense 
of appreciation. If this can be defended, then memory enhancement can be said to fortify 
moral character. Consider the use of drugs that regulate APMA19 receptors to aid in 
depolarization, or that increase CREB,20 a gene-activating molecule that produces 
proteins and buttresses synaptic strength. Applied to middle-aged and elderly 
populations,21 the ability to encode new memories would allow for a deeper experience 
ex post facto of critically significant life events.22 This enhancement certainly possesses 
the potential to lead to a deeper sense of appreciation for the already given, not a 
movement away from it.23,24 In the context of human health and well being, then, the 
“respect” argument seems to be one in favor of, not against, enhancement. Understood in 
this light, enhancing neurocognitive endowments seems to promote, not detract from, 
moral character, thereby edifying the caliber of overall cognition and thus contributing to 
the ability make pragmatically robust moral decisions. 
 
HUMAN NATURE AND THE EXECUTIVE-FUCTIONAL BRAIN 
 
 A second point of divergence in the enhancement debate concerns human nature. 
Refocused in the context of neurocognition, it specifically concerns how human nature is 
affected by manipulating the conception of one’s existence in the world. The 
philosophical conception of human nature as a set of shared moral ideals between human 
beings that distinguishes them from all other beings can be traced to the Aristotelian 
corpus. If these ideals are considered natural, they are consequentially regarded as 
essential rather than contingent or superfluous. This logic lends to the interpretation that 
if human beings were to lose any of the moral characteristics considered essential to 
human identity, they would cease to be human. The question is thus raised over whether 
neurocognitive enhancement contributes to or depreciates human nature. 
 
 The “Unnatural” Means of Human Dignity 
 
 With regard to human nature, two primary concerns frame the Council’s argument 
against enhancement. The first is that enhancement will alter or obliterate human nature, 
 
 19. Amino-3-hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazole propionic acid.  
 20. cAMP response element-binding protein. 
 21. Neurocognitive studies have indicated that this population in particular stand to gain most 
from memory enhancement technologies. See Farah et al., “Neurocognitive Enhancement,” 31-32.  
 22. The analysis of increasingly controversial memory augmentations such as dampening and 
vivifying transcend the scope of this paper. 
 23. Farah et al., “Neurocognitive Enhancement,” 31-32. 
 24. More to the point, an adequate sense of appreciation for “the given” in nature includes the 
appreciation of everything that is given, including memory enhancement techniques. 
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rending it man-made and therefore “cheap.”25 The second is that if enhancement alters or 
obliterates human nature, this will affect one’s ability to determine the good, because the 
ability to determine something is dependant on the nature of the determiner.26 As it 
pertains to the first concern, the principal fear is that one or more of the characteristics 
essential to human nature will inevitably be manipulated by neurocognitive enhancement, 
rendering one an alien to oneself (and others). The continual creation of these 
“transhuman others”27 might eventually result in the extinction of human beings. Since it 
is illogical to tamper with the wisdom of nature, it follows that it is illogical to attempt to 
become “better than well.” Thus, participation in enhancement would leave one with only 
the prodigality of free will.28  
 
 The second part of the argument is based on the notion that human goodness is 
inextricably linked to human nature. Transcending this nature – becoming “God-like” – 
undermines the apprehension and valuation of goodness, rendering nothing save for 
experiential, and thus existential, misunderstanding. Since understanding and valuing the 
good is essential to moral living, human beings must do everything possible to preserve 
it. Hence, any neurocognitive enhancement that would augment human nature is 
discouraged and must be avoided. In this view, human actions flow forth from human 
nature. Once nature is sacrificed by participating in enhancement, thereby “cheating” 
oneself out of oneself, the ability to determine the good and act upon it is lost.29 
 
 The Folly of Normative Essentialism 
 
  This paper rejects such normative essentialism30 as implausible for several 
reasons. First, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with altering human nature by means 
of enhancing executive function since the “naturally given” clearly contains both good 
and bad elements31 and because there is no persuasive reason to believe that in every 
effort to nuance the poor elements there would exist a disproportionate risk posed to 
those considered good.32 Second, if it were the case that executive function enhancement 
would “obliterate” human nature by transforming human beings into “hyper-agents,” this 
 
 25. President’s Council on Bioethics, “Beyond Therapy,” 61-64. See especially p. 62.  
 26. The metaphorical language used by the Council to demonstrate this point includes the 
inevitable gap created between “the dancer and the dance.” See President’s Council on Bioethics, “Beyond 
Therapy,” 61-64. See especially p. 64. 
 27. The Council also invokes concepts such as “God-like,” “hyper-agency,” “better than well,” 
“cheating,” “self-alienation,” “better model,” “less than human,” and several others to describe 
transhumanist desires. See President’s Council on Bioethics, “Beyond Therapy,” 58-72.  
 28. President’s Council on Bioethics, “Beyond Therapy,” 61-64.  
 29. President’s Council on Bioethics, “Beyond Therapy,” 61-64; 65-71.  
 30. Normative essentialism is the belief that comprehensive moral rules may be extracted from 
reflection on human nature. 
 31. Consider, for example, executive function deficits such as attention disorders, working 
memory miscues, and inhibitory control issues. While these are “naturally given,” no reasonable person 
would consider them intrinsically good. See Farah et al., “Neurocognitive Enhancement,” 33-34.  
 32. To be sure, the use of drugs that target dopamine and noradrenaline neurotransmitter faculties 
carry particular risks in the effort to augment the “naturally given” neurocognitive deficiencies, but 
certainly not in every case, and almost always within the realm of reasonable proportion. See Farah et al., 
“Neurocognitive Enhancement,” 33-34. 
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action would not in itself be wrong and may in fact be morally right.33 Third, it does not 
necessarily follow that adjusting human nature will result in the loss of the ability to 
make judgments about the good, because human beings requisitely possess a conception 
of the good by which they evaluate human nature itself.34 Finally, appeals to human 
nature generally effect obscurity in the moral debate over enhancement and can be 
ameliorated with more apposite considerations. 
 
 Applied in the context of executive function enhancement, the third reason above 
deserves immediate attention. What underlies the erroneous normative essentialist claim 
that nature and goodness are inextricably linked is the idea that to decipher whether 
something is good, one needs to know if it conforms to, or “fits” with, human nature. 
This paper has already noted one reason35 to reject this claim: appealing to the role nature 
plays in decision making is largely about recognizing constraints; therefore, rather than 
rendering human beings incapable of judging rightly – which is the (preexistent) 
existential plight of those to whom neurocognitive deficiencies have been “naturally 
given” – participation in executive function enhancement would simply require the 
consideration of new constraints.36 Based on the innate desire to evolve, then, 
participation in neurocognitive enhancement may be seen in this light as complimentary 
of, not a detraction from, human nature, thereby edifying the caliber of overall cognition 
and thus contributing to the ability make pragmatically robust moral decisions.  
 
IDENTITY AND THE EMOTIONAL-PERSONAL BRAIN 
 
 A third point of divergence in the enhancement debate concerns individual and 
social identity. Refocused in the context of neurocognition, it specifically concerns the 
individual and social effects of augmenting one’s identity in ways pertaining to emotional 
health and personality. To be human is to be a particular person, with a particular history, 
and with particular loves and memories that bind one to behave in particular ways. The 
possibilities of neurocognitive enhancement offer entry into an uncharted plane of being 
within which who one understands oneself to be in relation to self and society37 may be 
significantly amplified through techniques that would allow for emotional and personal 
 
 33. Prima facie, the action in question may at worst be considered morally neutral but by no 
means clearly and objectively morally wrong.  
 34. This exemplifies, among others, the logical fallacy of circulus in demonstrando.  
 35. There is, however, a second and more important reason to reject this claim: human beings 
already make coherent and reasonable judgments concerning human nature that can persuasively argue in 
favor of augmentation. Recognizing flaws in human nature – e.g., deficits of executive function such as 
attention disorders, working memory miscues, and inhibitory control issues – suggests that human beings 
have a concept of human nature that is independent of human nature itself. See Farah et al., 
“Neurocognitive Enhancement,” 33-34.  
 36. One plausible constraint would be to allow enhancement therapies to be accessed by only 
those most likely to benefit from them, which has typically proven to be those with the lowest working 
memory capacities, significant attention disorders, and multiple inhibitory control issues. Interestingly, at 
least one study has shown that the use of dopamine agonist bromocriptine improves the neurocognitive 
performance of individuals with a less-than-average working memory but lowers the performance of those 
with the highest natural capacities. See Farah et al., “Neurocognitive Enhancement,” 33-34. 
 37. For a still further analysis of the sociological implications of the promised future of 
neuroscience and its accompanying neuroethics, see Racine, Pragmatic Neuroethics, 215-21.  
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maturation or blunting. Issues related to moral responsibility and “manufactured” 
perceptions are hence inevitably called into question.  
 
Plentiful Ends, Partial Flourishing 
 
 With regard to individual and social identity, the Council’s position against 
enhancement manifests itself in two primary veins. The first refers to the idea that 
enhancement threatens the most precious piece of human existence: idiosyncratic 
identity. The second turns on the first, and concerns the notion that participation in 
enhancement provides others with the means to manipulate the identity that should be 
solely one’s own to “work out.”  As it pertains to the first concern, enhancement is 
viewed to remove the intelligible means necessary to understand one’s particularity in 
shared time and space.38 Participation thus threatens this essential identity, which is 
inextricably linked to moral responsibility,39 by allowing it to be usurped by the cold and 
impersonal hand of biotechnology. Consequentially, “self-alienation” is the inevitable 
destination on the journey toward actualizing this naïve “achievement.”40    
 
 The second part of the argument clings to the notion that enhancement effectively 
“de-agents” the subject and allows the “enhancer” to assume the subject’s identity as 
biotechnological puppet-master par excellence. Since personal achievements can only be 
personally achieved, it follows that impersonal achievements cannot be considered the 
work of individual persons.41 While it can be said that an individual self uses cognitive 
drugs to, for example, increase alertness, it cannot be said that an individual self thereby 
does the “alerting.” Rather, pharmacologicals have acted in place of a self and goals have 
been achieved only by means of sacrificing personal independence. The cardinal idea is 
that to be independent essentially requires possessing individual limits. Thus, by the mere 
act of participating in enhancement one undermines42 one’s own identity.43 
 
 Against Self-Reductionism 
 
 This paper rejects such self-reductionism for reasons beyond its unfortunate 
tendency to paint the unflattering portrait of people who pursue neurocognitive 
enhancement as unintelligent “identity-thieves” who prostitute dignity for gain at the cost 
of personal integrity. The position here is that emotional health and personality 
enhancement can promote individual and social identity for at least two reasons. The first 
 
 38. For the Council, “to be human is to be someone, not anyone – with a given nature (male or 
female), given natural abilities (superior wit or musical talent), and, most important, a real history of 
attachments, memories, and experiences, acquired largely by living with others.” See President’s Council 
on Bioethics, “Beyond Therapy,” 64.  
 39. In this way, identity is intimately linked with the conception and constitution of moral 
character.  
 40. President’s Council on Bioethics, “Beyond Therapy,” 64-65.  
 41. The metaphorical image used to capture this point is the student behind the calculator. Using 
the calculator does not de facto render the student a “knower” of mathematics, even if the student arrives at 
the correct answer through its use. See President’s Council on Bioethics, “Beyond Therapy,” 64-65. 
 42. In this case, a “pseudo-happiness” has been achieved at the cost of the same individual self 
necessary to secure a sense of happiness that can be called genuine and personal.  
 43. President’s Council on Bioethics, “Beyond Therapy,” 64-65.  
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concerns the idea that emotional health and personality enhancement may be used to 
correct existing individual neurocognitive deficiencies that result in individual injustices. 
The second concerns the idea that emotional health and personality enhancement may be 
used to correct individual neurocognitive deficiencies that result in social injustices. To 
exemplify the former, consider neurological studies that provide insight into the benefits 
of developing cognitive drugs that enhance underdeveloped neural correlates regulating 
negative emotions related to moral violations. The use of neurocognitive 
pharmacologicals may promise brain regions previously undeveloped, yet nonetheless 
implicated in moral development, a greater personal emotional content in moral stimuli.44 
So doing may combat individual injustices45 by leading to a comprehensively balanced 
understanding of idiosyncratic moral responsibility and the essential role of emotion in 
systematic decision-making.46  
 
 The second reason may be exemplified by considering neurological studies that 
provide insight into the benefits of developing cognitive drugs that enhance 
underdeveloped neural mechanisms47 that process moral sensitivity to issues related to 
justice and care. The use of neurocognitive pharmacologicals may promise activation to 
regions of the brain that experience abnormalities associated with dissociable neural 
processing events.48 So doing may combat social injustices49 by leading to a deeper 
awareness of concerns related to social justice while simultaneously developing one’s 
individual identity as related to others in the collective mission to express care and 
respect for well-being.50 In light of these reasons, then, neurocognitive enhancement may 
be defended as affecting a deeper sense of individual and social identity; thereby edifying 
the caliber of overall cognition and thus contributing to the ability make pragmatically 




 44. Racine, Pragmatic Neuroethics, 186.  
 45. Thus, rather than effectively sacrificing or annihilating one’s sense of self, emotional health 
and personality enhancement can be defended as the gateway into one’s authentic self and the individual 
moral responsibilities such a discovery demands one to observe.  
 46. Other emotional health and personality enhancement studies promotive of individual identity 
include, among others, the influence of bodily harm on neural correlates of semantic and moral decision 
making, the moral affiliation of disgust, and affective responses to one’s own moral violations. See Racine, 
Pragmatic Neuroethics, 184-89. 
 47. These include the polar medial prefrontal cortex, dorsal posterior cingulated cortex, and 
posterior superior temporal sulcus. See Racine, Pragmatic Neuroethics, 185.  
 48. These would include a dormant left intraparietal sulcus, which is associated with sensitivity to 
justice issues, or a dormant ventral posterior cingulate cortex, ventromedial and dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, and thalamus, which is associated with sensitivity to care issues. See Racine, Pragmatic 
Neuroethics, 185.  
 49. Thus, rather than effectually obscuring and demoting social identity, emotional health and 
personality enhancement can be defended an as invitation to participate more deeply and responsibly in the 
social story of which one is an integral individual part, thereby promoting the rational capacity to decipher 
the good.  
 50. Other emotional health and personality enhancement studies promotive of social identity 
include, among others, gender differences in neural mechanisms underlying moral sensitivity, the neural 
basis of belief encoding and integration in moral judgment, and the functional networks in emotional moral 
and nonmoral social judgments. See Racine, Pragmatic Neuroethics, 184-89.  
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 Memory, executive function, and emotional health and personality are but three 
issues of principal significance in the debate over the moral licitness of neurocognitive 
enhancement. Through the lens of a critical-dialogical framework, the aim of this paper 
has been to address the aforementioned issues with the intention of positing the argument 
that neurocognitive enhancement can be justified as morally plausible in its potential to 
edify the caliber of overall cognition and thus contribute to the ability make 
pragmatically robust moral decisions on the conditions that it (i) promotes general moral 
character, (ii) compliments human nature, and (iii) effects a deeper sense of individual 
and social identity. To that end it has been successful.  
 
 The implications here are significant. To be sure, the reality of enhancement 
extremism is a genuine and growing fear. But rather than allowing it to terminate human 
progress, it may instead serve to remind that while the benefits of neurocognitive 
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